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Abstract 
Environmental policy aims at preserving environmental values. But what is the 
point… i) of the concept of environmental values and ii) of environmental values 
that will actually be reached? This thesis focuses on both these questions.  
Setting an environmental target requires a, implicit or explicit, trade-off between 
values. Even though economics offers a theoretical foundation as well as methods 
for this, it might be argued that other values should be considered. Paper I investi-
gates the meaning of, and relation between, different value related terms. The value 
perspective is crucial: biological objects might have an economic value whereas biolo-
gical values, interpreted as intrinsic, are incommensurable with economic values.  
Paper II discusses potential implications of differences between the value 
perspectives asserted by respondents of stated preference (SP) surveys and the 
perspective implied by the valuation question. It is concluded that implied and 
asserted rights are incompatible in most of the potential situations and that this offers 
a coherent explanation to anomalies often found in SP-surveys.  
Paper III and IV apply econometric tools for explaining why firms violate or 
comply with environmental regulations. In both studies it is shown that the 
frequency of inspections are important to encourage compliance. In Paper III results 
from non-parametric methods revealed that smaller, and less environmentally 
harmful, firms have higher frequency of violation in the absence of inspections but 
that they increase their compliance more as a response to increased inspection 
frequency. In none of the papers it can be excluded that the inspections affect 
behaviour both through the deterrent effect and by the increased knowledge 
following from the information from the inspectors.  
In Paper IV is the potential effect of social capital and environmental 
consciousness in focus. It is shown that the effect social capital, measured as trust, 
has on compliance is non-linear and partly negative. A possible explanation to this 
counter-intuitive result is that trust, in a naïve form, is exploited by firms governed 
by calculated rather than social or normative motives.  
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1  Introduction 
What is the point of environmental values that will be reached with 
environmental regulations? Moreover what is the point of environmental 
values? One of the central subjects in environmental economics is the design 
of policy measures for achieving a more desirable use of the environment 
and of the natural resources. This thesis focuses on two groups of questions, 
both in different ways related to the broader question of policy measures.  
First, in order to formulate an environmental target towards which the 
policy should aim the question of environmental values is unavoidable. 
Dealing with environmental values in an economic perspective is just one of 
many possible bases for discussing, analysing and potentially setting an 
environmental target. Paper I and II deal with the relation between different 
perspectives of values in general and especially the meaning of and 
assumptions behind the term economic value. In Paper I this subject is 
analysed from a value theoretical perspective and in Paper II potential 
implications for the estimation of values through stated preference methods 
are analysed.  
Second, in order to fulfil the aims of an environmental policy it is 
necessary to guarantee a sufficient level of compliance. Paper III and IV deal 
with the driving forces behind the decisions to comply or to violate. Paper 
III presents the results from an empirical study where the effects of 
inspection related variables are estimated for different type of firms in 
Sweden 1992 and 1995. In Paper IV data from 2005 – 2007 have been used 
to investigate the effects of both inspections and social capital.  
In this introductory chapter these topics are put into a broader context of 
environmental economics. Thereafter the four papers are summarised 
separately before a concluding discussion.  
This is a thesis in environmental economics, especially microeconomics. 
Economics in general deals with human use of scarce resources and even if 
traditional micro and welfare economics start from quite specific 
assumptions about human behaviour there are, in the economic discipline,   10
different assumptions and different interpretations about how human 
behaviour can be understood. Moreover, in today’s society much of the 
human behaviour has environmental relevance; indeed almost every action 
can be analysed from the viewpoint of environmental impact. This means 
that environmental economics does not have any clear demarcations. 
However, the central questions in environmental economics are:  
 
1.  How should we, as a society, use the environment and other scarce 
natural resources?  
2.  How do we, or will we, use the environment and the natural resources 
under different institutional settings? 
 
The first question is a normative question that can only be answered in 
relation to a specific value premise (Ariansen, 1992). In welfare economics 
the normative criterion is usually that human welfare, subjectively defined 
by individuals, should be maximised (Malinvaud, 1972; Ng, 1979; Randall, 
1987; Sagoff, 1994; Spash & Hanley, 1995). Other norms may be used as 
value premises for how resources should be used, e.g. GDP or the growth 
in GDP should be maximised, wealth should be fairly distributed, the 
wealth of the poorest should increase or the resources should be used so that 
a sustainable development is achieved. All of these value premises can be 
interpreted differently and need to be clarified to become practically useful 
as guidance for how resources should be used (Lockwood, 1997). Common 
for all these, and other value premises is that they are, explicitly or 
implicitly, based on more fundamental ideas about what is valuable and, 
even more fundamental, what constitutes a “value” (Ariansen, 1992). Paper 
I deals with the meaning of different value-related terms. In Paper I the 
value perspective of welfare economics is put into a broader value 
theoretical perspective to compare it with the meaning of other value 
related terms, such as “biological values”. Hence, Paper I deals with the 
normative part of environmental economics and the results are useful for 
dealing with questions such as should an economic analysis be used when 
biological values are threatened? 
The first central question stated above raises fundamental philosophical 
questions about e.g. how the term value can be interpreted (Beckerman & 
Pasek, 1997; Brown, 1984; Gren et al., 1994; Jones, 1993; O’Neill, 1992; 
Sagoff, 1994; Vadnjal & O'Connor, 1994). Once this question is, at least 
preliminary or conditionally, answered on a general level a decision about 
real resource use usually requires that the relevant values are measured and 
taken into account. A general conclusion in economics is that the 
institution, usually called the market, under some specific circumstances 
leads to a use of resources that maximises social welfare, as defined in   11 
normative economics (Eggertsson, 1990; Randall, 1987). On a market, 
consumers, who are assumed to know their own preferences and thus the 
subjective values of goods and services, communicate these values through 
their market behaviour. Since resources are scarce the competing desires 
will result in prices signalling the relative scarcity of resources, goods and 
services. This guarantees that the relevant values are actually measured, by 
each actor herself, and taken into account by others as prices on markets.  
However, it is a general conclusion in environmental economics that 
markets tend to fail to efficiently allocate the use of goods or resources that 
are non-exclusive and/or non-rival, just as many environmental and natural 
resources are (Pearce & Turner, 1990; Perman et al., 1996; Randall, 1987; 
Tietenberg, 2006). This is so since the non-exclusiveness means that 
resources can be used without payment, which in turn means that the user 
neither has to communicate her own valuations nor take others’ valuations 
into consideration. Moreover, the non-rival quality means that it is not 
desirable to make the resource exclusive even if it is possible. The second 
central question stated above is a positive question about how resources are 
or will be used. The general answer to that question, from an environmental 
economic analysis, is that markets sometimes guide the resource use as 
desired (according to normative economics) but that market failures often 
lead to an inefficient use of natural resources and to an undesirable 
degradation of the environment.  
This raises the positive question whether the resources will be used in a 
more desirable way if the markets are complemented with some kind of 
policy measures? Before designing and eventually implementing policy 
measures the normative question about how resources should be used has to 
be considered. What is the target of the policy measure? How much pastoral 
landscape or how much pollution is desirable? Still assuming that the idea of 
welfare maximisation should be guiding the resource use it should now be 
noted that the values are to be communicated to the actors through a policy 
measure. Hence, the values are not communicated directly by the 
consumers, as on a market, but indirectly through the authorities’ 
implementation of policy measures (Perman et al., 1996; Randall, 1987; 
Tietenberg, 2006). This raises a need to collect information about the values 
that individuals attach to the natural resource in question. The branch of 
environmental valuation aims at doing this; to measure the value that 
individuals attach to environmental goods (Freeman, III, 2003; Hanemann, 
1994). Paper II deals with questions related to environmental valuation in 
the light of the results of Paper I.  
Paper II starts from the assumption that the value theoretical perspective 
of welfare economics is, at least conditionally, accepted and that the values 
people attach to environmental goods have to be measured. Since people in   12
many cases do not have possibilities to express their values entirely through 
their behaviour on any markets, a range of stated preference methods have 
been developed and used (Freeman, III, 2003; Hanemann, 1994; Vatn, 
2004). The basic idea of these methods is to ask people to hypothetically 
express their values, as willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept 
(WTA), for specific changes environmental quality. Among the problems 
with these methods is that it can be questioned whether respondents take 
their budget restriction into account, as they are forced to do when 
communicating their valuations through markets, or if the hypothetical 
situation leads to a hypothetical bias where respondents e.g. overstate their 
true WTP (see e.g. Braga & Starmer, 2005; Curtis, 2001; Hanemann, 1994; 
Hanley & Shogren, 2005; Stevens et al., 1991; Sugden, 2005; Söderqvist, 
1998 for discussions about these and other problems). Without rejecting this 
or other potential biases in the stated preference methods Paper II concludes 
that different value perspectives among respondents, e.g. as described in 
Paper I, offer a common explanation for many anomalies found in stated 
preference investigations. Disregarding that more basic value-related 
questions have to be clarified before e.g. a WTP question can be answered, 
the answers to stated preference questions may be interpreted as the 
intended WTP statement even though the respondents have taken the 
opportunity to express opinions about a more fundamental question such as 
how the rights should have been distributed.  
Paper I and II thus point out that the welfare economic perspective of 
values is just one of many potential value perspectives, but that many other 
value related terms are compatible with and can be interpreted from that 
perspective. Moreover, empirically measuring the values people attach to 
environmental quality offers a possibility for respondents to express values 
from perspectives that are not necessarily compatible with the specific 
welfare economic assumptions underlying the economic interpretation of 
the answers. Hence, defining the desirable goal for an environmental policy 
measure requires both a choice of value perspective and that this perspective, 
at least conditionally, is accepted by the respondents asked to state their 
preferences. This conclusion may be interpreted as precluding the 
possibilities to formulate environmental targets or even environmental 
policies. However, environmental policy can be based on any 
environmental target independently if it is based on a stringent analysis of 
values and an appurtenant estimation of values. Moreover, environmental 
economics offers tools for analysing environmental policy even if the target 
for the policy is formulated from other value perspectives than welfare 
economics
1.  
                                                  
1 One should however be careful to uncritically apply e.g. a cost efficiency analysis when the 
environmental target is based on values not compatible with the welfare economic   13 
Environmental policy can be analysed from question 2 above, i.e. as a 
positive question. What is the outcome of different policy measures? What 
will the effects on the environment and on the use of other resources be 
when applying different policy measures? The desirability of different policy 
measures can then, in a normative analysis, be compared to different 
objectives or values. In such analyses different types of policy measures (e.g. 
command and control, economic incentives and tradable permits) are 
compared to objectives such as cost efficiency, goal fulfilment, dynamic 
efficiency and distributional effects. It can be noted that complying with any 
environmental policies normally entail additional costs to e.g. polluters or 
producers of public goods such as biodiversity
2. Hence, there are incentives 
to violate any policy measures (Becker, 1968; Cohen, 1999). One of the 
differences between different policy measures is that the incentives to violate 
are of varying strength; the more costly it is to comply with the measure, 
the more profitable it is to not comply and the stronger is the incentive for 
violation. However there are also incentives for complying with 
environmental policies, and if these outweigh the opposite incentives, the 
individual business will choose to comply. Paper III and IV deal with the 
question of what kind of incentives encourage the compliance with en-
vironmental regulations. Three kind of motives behind the decision to 
comply can be distinguished and labeled: normative, social and economic 
motives (Bouvier, 2009; Burby & Paterson, 1993; Mcgraw & Scholz, 1991; 
Winter & May, 2001).  
The normative motive is based on a desire to fulfil moral beliefs or 
obligations whereas the social motive is the desire to fulfil expectations from 
others (Arora & Gangopadhyay, 1995; Foulon et al., 2002; Gunningham et 
al., 2004; Hatcher et al., 2000; Stafford, 2007). Such expectations may also 
be based on moral beliefs, but the moral of e.g. employees or customers 
rather than the managers. Finally, the economic motive is based on the 
desire to maximize profit and hence influenced by the costs of compliance 
and of violation (Becker, 1968; Cohen, 1987; Gray & Scholz, 1993; Magat 
& Viscusi, 1990; Nadeau, 1997; Nostbakken, 2008; Nyborg & Telle, 2006; 
Stafford, 2002). Compliance normally entails costs, such as abatement costs, 
but also possibly the payment of pollution taxes etc. Violation, on the other 
hand, potentially entails costs of decreasing sales (if demand decrease e.g. as a 
moral statement from consumers) and costs of legal sanctions. The later has 
                                                                                                              
perspective of values. Since all costs are opportunity costs, i.e. forgone values, even the 
analysis of costs is based on a specific perspective of values.  
2 A subsidy means that financial means, sometimes more than enough to cover the costs, is 
transferred to the business. It is, however, in principle possible to accept the subsidy 
without fulfilling the requirements. Hence, as long as violation of the agreement does not 
involve any costs, such as fines, it is costly to actually fulfil the aim of a subsidy.    14
been in focus in the economic analysis of compliance, where the general 
claim is that potential penalty and probability of detection influence the 
expected cost of violation (e.g. Burby & Paterson, 1993; Eckert, 2004; Gray 
& Deily, 1996; Harrison, 1995; Laplante & Rilstone, 1996; Magat & 
Viscusi, 1990; Nadeau, 1997; Nyborg & Telle, 2006; Stafford, 2002). 
Hence, the authorities should complement any policy measures with 
supervision and penalties for violation in order to encourage and, at least to 
a certain level, guarantee compliance. In Paper III and IV the effects of the 
authorities’ inspection activities in Sweden are investigated. According to 
the theory more frequent inspections should, ceteris paribus, lead to higher 
compliance since the probability of detection will increase with the 
frequency of inspections. This conclusion is confirmed by both of the 
empirical studies reported in Paper III and IV. However, both studies also 
support the idea that other factors affect compliance, such as the type of firm 
regulated (Paper III) and the level of social capital (Paper IV).  
To sum up the introduction, the core of this thesis is different aspects 
related to environmental policy, especially questions that, in a sense, 
surround the questions about what kind of policy measures should be used 
and their effects. First, all policies are based on some values. The meaning of 
value related terms and the effects of different value perspectives for 
environmental valuation are thus important when discussing and defining 
the environmental targets for environmental policies. Second, the 
compliance with any environmental policy is dependent on the incentives 
to comply and violate. The inspection activities are found to be one 
important incentive to comply. Moreover, as will be further developed in 
the summary of Paper IV, the environmental interest and the social trust 
among the public also affects the compliance with environmental 
regulations.    15 
2  Summaries of appended papers 
In the previous section the questions dealt with in the separate papers have 
been put into a broader concept of environmental policy and environmental 
economics. In this section the appended papers, Paper I – IV, are 
summarized separately.  
2.1  Summary of Paper I 
In Paper I the value perspective of welfare economics is put into a broader 
value theoretical perspective and related to some non-economic value-
related terms. The main objective of the paper is to place different value-
related terms into a common value theoretical framework, and thereby 
improve the possibility of understanding the relations between the terms.  
One rationale for the purpose is the extensive use of different value-
related terms in the debate about the changes of the agricultural landscape. It 
is  for example stressed that these changes threaten biological, cultural 
historical, recreational, economic and aesthetical values attached to the 
landscape. However, as an analysis in the paper shows, the meanings of the 
value-related terms are often unclear. This means that the relations between 
the terms are unclear and that comparisons between different values 
becomes incoherent which, in the end, may result in less suitable policy 
measures.  
The analysis of the terms shows that clear connection to theory of values 
often is missing. It is suggested that many value-related terms do not have a 
clear normative meaning and that such terms would be clearer if the word 
“value” were omitted. I.e. instead of “biological values”, terms such as 
“biological functions” and “biological objects”, both of which may have 
value, will improve the understanding.  
The term “economic value” has however, at least for an economist, a 
clear and normative meaning. The term indicates an anthropocentric value 
subjectivistic perspective and it is possible to interpret other value-related   16
terms within that perspective. For example, biological functions may have 
an economic value. To emphasize that other values should not be added to 
the economic value the term Economic Measure of Total Value (EMTV) is 
suggested.  
The analysis shows that it is important to be clear about the definition of 
values. An economic analysis implies a specific value perspective that, in 
principle, comprises “biological values” if that term refers to “biological 
objects” of “biological functions”. In that case no biological values should 
be added to the economic value. Of course, some values may, in practice, 
be difficult or not possible to measure. In that sense it can be said that “the 
(economic) value of some biological objects should be added to an 
incomplete estimation of an economic value”.  
The economic value does not, on the other hand, comprise “biological 
values” if that term refers to “intrinsic biological values”. Neither in that 
case can the “biological values” be added to the economic value since the 
values, interpreted in this way, are logically incommensurable.  
2.2  Summary of Paper II 
In Paper II the value perspective of welfare economics is accepted as a 
normative assumption for economic analyses. Instead, the theoretical analysis 
in the paper focuses on the possible diverging value perspectives among 
respondents in SP surveys. More generally, the main aim of the paper is to 
suggest a framework for interpretation of people’s value expressions and to 
analyse if this framework can explain some of the “anomalies” found in 
stated preference surveys (e.g. the occurrence of lexicographic preferences, 
protests, preference reversals and respondents opposing the economic 
interpretation of WTP or WTA answers).  
There are two rationales for the purpose. The first rational is to try to 
find a common explanation and understanding for different anomalies, i.e. 
value expressions that do not fit into economic theory and that have been 
explained by diverging ad hoc explanations. The second rational is the 
conclusion from Paper  I that, from the economic perspective, many 
different value perspectives can be interpreted as opinions about the initial 
distribution of rights.  
The framework is based on three assumptions. First, that people may 
have opinions about how initial rights should be distributed. Second, that 
acceptance of property rights is a necessary precondition for preference 
formation. Third, that property rights may be accepted only if they i) 
cannot be affected or ii) in the case they can be affected that they are 
regarded as morally legitimate.    17 
From these assumptions it is concluded that SP surveys place people in a 
situation where they may perceive that property rights can be affected and 
where they may find the implied rights morally illegitimate. Hence, the 
implied rights may not be accepted and consequently the respondent may 
not have formed any preferences and can therefore not express any relevant 
WTP or WTA. However, since the respondent may have opinions about 
how the rights should be distributed she may take the opportunity to 
express this value. In the paper it is stressed that such value expressions 
should be interpreted as non-preferential value expressions and that such an 
interpretation can serve as a general explanation for different anomalies.  
Hence, if respondents are to express preferences (or rather WTP/WTA 
measures) in SP surveys it is crucial that they, at least conditionally, accept 
the rights implied by the WTP or WTA question. For example a WTP 
question implies that the respondent does not have the right. If the 
respondent confronted with such a question asserts that she has or should 
have the right, she may report this opinion instead of any WTP measure 
based on preferences. This means that concordance between the rights 
implied by the question and the rights asserted by the respondent is 
necessary for the formation and expression of preferences. In case of 
incompatibility no preferences may be formed. This can explain previous 
anomalies, such as refusals to answer, protests or “lexicographic 
preferences”.  
Possible asserted rights are categorized into five classes and the possible 
reactions to SP surveys are discussed in relation to WTP and WTA 
questions. The result of the analysis is, as summarised in Table 1, that perfect 
concordance will occur only in two or three out of ten cases of 
combinations between implied and asserted rights.  
Table 1. Relations between asserted and implied rights. Incompatibility (INC) means that respondents 
may have problems to form preferences and concordance (CON) means that preferences may be formed.  
  Respondent asserts that she 
has the right 
Respondent asserts that 
other party has the right 
 Privately  Collectively  Privately  Collectively 
Respondent asserts 
that “third party” 
has private or 
collective right 
WTP-
quest. 
(IWTP) 
INC 
(IIWTP) 
INC 
(IIIWTP) 
CON 
(IVWTP) 
INC 
(VWTP) 
INC 
WTA-
quest. 
(IWTA) 
CON 
(IIWTA) 
INC 
(IIIWTA) 
INC / 
CON 
(IVWTA) 
INC 
(IVWTA) 
INC 
 
This result offers an argument against the recommendation to always use the 
WTP format. Moreover, for amenities where the respondent asserts 
collective rights, both the WTP and the WTA question imply rights that   18
may be incompatible with the asserted rights. This means that, for many 
environmental goods, neither the WTP  nor the WTA question may imply 
rights that can be accepted by the respondents. If a right means that the 
owner explicitly must agree on selling, and if people assert that future 
generations, which cannot agree explicitly, have rights, then respondents 
may refuse to get involved in any exchanges at all.  
2.3  Summary of Paper III 
In Paper III the influence of inspections on the compliance behaviour with 
environmental regulations is investigated. To take possible non-linearities 
and interaction effects into account non-parametric methods were used, and 
the results from these estimations were compared with results from OLS and 
semi-parametric estimations. 
Other factors, previously shown to potentially affect the compliance 
behaviour, were included in the statistical models. The rate of unannounced 
visits in relation to total number of visits were used as a measure of 
inspection style where a more frequent use of unannounced visits indicated 
a more confronting inspection style. Variables indicating enforcement 
budget, the type of firms, year, inspection authority and community 
characteristics were also included in the models. Type of firms were 
indicated by the A, B and C classes as defined in the Environmental 
Protection Act and the appurtenant Environment Protection Ordinance 
(SFS (1989:364), 1997), where A objects typically have the potentially 
highest, and C objects the lowest, impact on the environment. The variable 
for authority indicated whether municipalities or counties were responsible 
for the inspections. Of the two variables on community characteristics one 
was a variable for income and the other a variable for the frequency of 
members of the largest environmental organization in Sweden.  
The results indicate that visit frequency, budget resources and type of 
object had a significant impact on the violation frequency, but that the other 
variables had no significant impact (Table 2). 
Table 2. Significant variables (at the 10 level) in non-parametric, semi-parametric and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimations. 
Model R
2  P-values for estimates significant at the 10 level 
   visits_fr  costs  ord_type 
Non-parametric 0.20  0.000  0.005  0.000 
Semi-parametric 0.20  0.000  0.000  0.000 
        B objects  C objects 
OLS 0.14  0.093  0.092  0.010  0.000 
   19 
The results concerning the effect of inspection frequency confirm that 
inspections have a positive effect on compliance but that the effects differ 
between the types of firms. The violation frequency among A objects 
decreases, as shown in Figure 1, with increasing frequency of inspections. C 
objects, with a higher frequency of violation when inspection rate is low, 
are more sensitive to the inspection rate, see Figure 2. The result for B 
objects, which is not illustrated here, is similar to the result for A objects. 
One possible explanation to this difference is that C objects generally are 
smaller and presumably do not have the same possibilities of keeping 
themselves informed about environmental regulations and obligations. Since 
the inspectors partly act as advisors, it cannot be excluded that the decreased 
frequency of violation is an effect of increased knowledge after more visits.  
The results from the non-parametric model also revealed that increased 
budget resources affect violation frequency differently depending on type of 
firm. While violation frequency decreased in budget resources for A object 
(see Figure 1), and was unaffected for B objects, it increased for C objects 
(see  Figure 2). The unexpected result for C objects may be because 
authorities responsible for more A objects both have more resources and 
tend to devote relatively more effort to the A objects with possibly larger 
environmental impacts. Thus they have fewer resources for inspections of C 
objects, which may decrease the quality of the inspections. As an effect of 
the subsequent smaller deterrent effect and/or less information and advice, 
the violation thus increases among C objects when the budget increases.  
 
Figure 1. Violation as a function of visit frequency and budget resources for A objects.   20
 
Figure 2. Violation as a function of visit frequency and budget resources for C objects. 
2.4  Summary of Paper IV 
In Paper IV the basic question is the same as in Paper III; i.e. why do firms 
comply with environmental regulations? However, the focus is on the 
effects of social capital and environmental consciousness among the 
population and whether inclusion of these factors in the model increases the 
understanding of compliance behaviour. The models hence comprise 
variables for inspection frequency, inspection style, social capital, 
environmental consciousness, inspection authority and year.  
The statistical analyses in Paper IV are based on data for the years 2005-
2007, i.e. after the Swedish Environmental Code (SFS (1998:808), 2009) 
had replaced the Environmental Protection Act, which occurred on January 
1, 1999. To a considerable extent similar rules remain in force; activities are 
classified in relation to their “potential environmental influence”, both 
municipalities and county administrative board exercise supervision and the 
supervision authorities are responsible both for giving information and 
advice and for taking measures to ensure that violations are corrected. There 
are four kinds of sanctions that can be taken by the supervision authorities: 
injunctions, prohibitions (both possibly under a penalty of a fine), environmental 
sanction charge and report to the police or prosecution authorities. The Environ-  21 
mental Sanction Charge was introduced in the Code in order to improve the 
compliance  
In the empirical analysis the frequency of violation was used as 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables were inspection frequency, 
inspection style, social capital, environmental consciousness, authority and year. The 
inspection style was measured as the percentage of detected violations that 
result in a formal punishment. A higher percentage indicates a more 
stringent inspection style which presumably will affect the probability of 
punishments and thus increase the compliance. On the other hand, a 
“softer” inspection style may strengthen an atmosphere of mutual trust 
which also may have a positive effect on compliance. Two indicators of 
social capital were tested, namely the degree of social trust and the degree of 
engagement in organisations.  Environmental consciousness was indicated by a 
variable for environmental interest among the population.  
Three models were used to explain violation with the explanatory 
variables described above; a linear OLS, a quadratic OLS and a quadratic 
stepwise regression. Each of the models was tested with each of the two 
variables indicating social capital; trust and engagement in organizations. In the 
quadratic models squared variables and interaction terms were included. 
Since some of these were found to be significant, at the same time as the 
R
2-values were higher than for the linear models, it was concluded that the 
inclusion of non-linearities is important to capture more of the effects of the 
variables.  
Both increased frequency of inspections and a more stringent inspection 
style were shown to have a positive impact on compliance, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. However, the effect of inspections is dependent on the inspection 
style; the higher the share of formal punishments, the smaller is the effect of 
inspections. When only formal punishments are used the frequency of visits 
seems to be of no effect; the violation frequency is low over the whole 
interval of visit frequency. It is also notable that the frequency of visits 
affects compliance even if no formal punishments are used. This may be 
explained e.g. by the importance of information and advice and/or by the 
fact that detected violation entails other kind of costs than formal 
punishments. While the variables for year were insignificant in all models 
the variable for authority was significant in the quadratic models with trust, 
indicating that compliance is higher where the counties are responsible for 
the inspections.  
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Figure 3. Violation frequency as a function of inspection frequency and inspection style 
(other variables at their mean).  
Social capital was found, when indicated by trust, to have significant effect 
on compliance. The effect of social capital is non-linear and dependent on 
the level of environmental interest. When the population is more interested 
in environmental questions and the level of trust is low, the effect of 
increased trust is mainly negative on compliance, see Figure 4. When the 
interest in environmental questions is lower and the level of trust is higher, 
the effect on compliance does, however, become positive.    23 
  
Figure 4. Violation frequency as a function of social capital, measured as trust, and 
environmental interest with other variables at their mean.  
The result indicates that social capital does not necessarily encourage 
compliance but that the relationship is more complicated and that it 
sometimes encourages violation. Bearing in mind that the concept of social 
capital is vague, that the measure used has conceptual weaknesses and that 
there are imperfection in data, the variable nevertheless was found to be 
significant, which calls for possible explanations. The anticipation of positive 
effect relies on the assumptions that trust in others means that one pays more 
attention to the desires of others in one’s own decisions and that the degree 
of trust among the public was representative for the business managers. If 
firm managers have less trust than the population in general and/or if they 
do not regard trust as a motive for responsible behaviour, a higher level of 
trust does not mean that they have any normative motive for compliance. 
However, if firms are punished for violations by a decreasing demand they 
have a calculated motive for compliance. Such punishment depends on 
consumers keeping themselves informed. A possible explanation for the 
negative impact on compliance is thus that trust may hamper the efforts to 
seek information, since trust means that a person believes that she already 
knows, and that more trust, at least in a naïve form, can be exploited by 
firms.    24
Environmental interest also had a significant non-linear effect on 
compliance, see Figure 4. The compliance is highest where the 
environmental interest is either high or low. There is no simple explanation 
for this relationship; it rather highlights the fact that the causality between 
the factors is not straightforward. Again, the effect may be partly explained 
by differences between the general population and firm managers. A 
possible explanation is also that the actual change in consumer behaviour, 
which may encourage compliance, only follows with the higher levels of 
environmental interest.    25 
3  Concluding discussion  
The two first papers deal with two questions, which could have been raised 
by e.g. a policy maker in order to formulate the target for environmental 
policy: is the elicitation of economic values i) desirable and ii) possible? The 
two other papers also deal with questions that are fundamental in order to 
design an environmental policy; why do firms comply with environmental 
regulations and how can the compliance be improved? Naturally there are 
no definitive answers to such questions but the analyses of this thesis may 
serve as input into an ongoing discussion about these and related questions.  
Whether the elicitation of economic measures of values is desirable 
depends, ultimately, on whether one agrees on the normative assumptions 
of economics. The economic concept of values is, in a sense, complete. 
Conceptually it embraces, once the perspective is adopted, all values so that 
a normative weighing, taking all effects of for example a policy measure into 
consideration, can be made. In practice, i.e. empirically, there are still 
problems in eliciting the economic measure of value due to methodological 
shortcomings. On a conceptual level this is however not an argument 
against the desirability of eliciting economic measures of values, at least as 
long as methods can be improved to reduce the problems. Then, if the 
economic concept of values is complete, can other perspectives of values, 
other value premises than economic premises, be regarded as redundant? 
The answer is no. If one does not agree on the normative assumptions in 
economics, it may simply be rejected as irrelevant even though it is 
complete. As clarified in Paper I, the choice of value perspective is an 
important normative question and there are no objective arguments for why 
the economic perspective is better or worse than any other perspective of 
values. When adopting the economic perspective of values one should be 
aware of which normative assumptions the choice implies and how other 
value-related terms can be understood from this perspective.  
Whether it is possible to elicit (correct) economic measures of values is a 
question that has been discussed in relation to SP methods as long as the   26
methods have been used. This thesis adds some arguments to that discussion. 
Since, as clarified in Paper II, individuals may defend other perspectives of 
values, the result of empirical economic analyses may depend on values that 
logically cannot be interpreted as preferences. The conclusion is that 
incompatibility between implied and asserted rights can explain many of the 
anomalies found in SP studies. It is therefore, even if the economic 
perspective of values is preferred and adopted, important to have some 
understanding of non-economic perspectives of values. Even when an 
economic perspective of values has been adopted the distribution of initial 
rights is a question that may be a ground for disagreements. If respondents 
assert that they have a collective right, both the WTP and the WTA ques-
tion imply rights that may be incompatible with the asserted rights. This 
means that, for many environmental goods, neither the WTP nor the WTA 
question may imply rights that can be accepted by the respondents. If it is 
not possible to convince people that implied rights are legitimate or not 
possible to affect, it may be not be possible to elicit a correct measure of 
economic value. This may be the case e.g. for amenities where respondents 
assert that future generations have rights.  
Another important conclusion based on the two first papers is that 
information about public opinions on environmental values and initial 
distribution of rights may be regarded as relevant in itself. Even if such 
opinions cannot be the ground for setting exact environmental targets they 
are important for the design of an environmental policy that is not “only” 
efficient but also regarded as legitimate. Therefore, e.g. the choice between 
taxes and subsidies, which can both be constructed to lead to cost efficiency, 
can be analysed in relation to opinions about how initial rights should be 
distributed.  
The two papers dealing with compliance with environmental regulations 
both start from the question why firms comply with environmental 
regulations. Theoretically, the frequency of inspections should have a 
positive effect on compliance, which also has been confirmed by previous 
empirical studies. This result was also confirmed in both Paper III and IV of 
this thesis. In both studies the frequency of inspections was shown to have a 
significant and positive effect on compliance. It is worth noting that both 
studies suggested a linear relationship even though the models allowed for 
other functional forms. In Paper III a non-parametric estimation was used, 
which means that no functional form at all was presumed. Hence, the 
detected linear relationship is not constructed by any predefined assumption 
on functional form. In Paper IV the quadratic form of the variable was 
rejected whereas the linear form was significant.  
Two other effects related to the frequency of visits were detected. First, 
in Paper III it was shown that firms classified as C activities, were more   27 
sensitive to the frequency of visits than A- and B-classified firms (compare 
e.g. Figure 1 and Figure 2). Whether this effect remained during 2005-2007, 
i.e. under the Environmental Protection Code, could not be detected from 
the data used in Paper IV. For this later time period the limited amount of 
data did not allow for either making use of non-parametric methods or 
distinguishing between types of firms.  
The second important conclusion about the impact of visits, drawn from 
Paper IV, is that the impact depends on the inspection style. Whereas a 
higher frequency of visits is necessary to encourage compliance when a 
softer inspection style is adopted, an inspection style using formal 
punishments encourages compliance even with lower frequency of visits 
(see Figure 4). Is this a new phenomenon, compared to 1992 and 1995, 
following from the increased set of penalties in the Environmental 
Protection Code? It is possible but it cannot be confirmed from the present 
studies. In the study about the effects those earlier years, under the 
Environmental Protection Act, there is no data on the inspections style 
measured as relative emphasis on formal penalties. The rate of unannounced 
visits was insignificant in that study but unfortunately we do not know if 
formal/informal inspections style affected compliance during that time.  
What is the causality behind the impact of frequency of visits? There are 
at least two possible explanations, which do not necessarily exclude each 
other. First, the increased probability of costly penalties will most probably 
have a deterrent effect that increases compliance. Second, information and 
advice will increase the ability, and perhaps the desire, to comply. Since the 
role of the Swedish inspectors, during both of the periods investigated, have 
been to act both as supervisors and as advisors both of the effects may have 
affected the compliance. No definitive conclusion on the relative 
importance of these two effects can be drawn from the studies presented 
here. However, there are some indications that the two effects are 
complementary. First, the frequency of visits has a positive effect on comp-
liance even when few or no formal penalties are used (see Figure 4). The 
effect might be explained by the deterrent effect of informal penalties but it 
can also be interpreted as an effect of increased information and advice. 
Second, Paper III showed that C objects had a higher frequency of 
violations if no or few visits were made. There are no obvious reasons to 
assume that the managers of those firms would care less about 
environmental aspects but smaller firms may very well have fewer resources 
to keep up with juridical requirements. If this was the case, more 
information (via more visits) would lead to increased compliance, just as 
found in Paper III. However, the deterrent effect also seems to be 
important. Otherwise the inspection style, measured as relative importance 
of formal penalties, would not have any effect. In Figure 3 it is shown that   28
an increase in the stringency of inspections, which will increase the 
expected cost of penalties, has a positive effect on compliance. Hence there 
is a deterrent effect that seems to be complementary to the effect of 
increased information and advises.  
Three differences in the two studies should be noted. First, two different 
measures for environmental attitudes were used. In Paper III the relative 
number of members in the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation was 
used as an indicator of environmental interest and found to be insignificant 
as explanatory variable for compliance. In Paper IV a self-reported rating of 
environmental interest was used. This variable turned out to be significant 
but having a non-linear effect on compliance without an obvious 
interpretation. Second, in both studies a dummy-variable for authority were 
included. In Paper III the variable was insignificant whereas it had a 
significant effect on compliance for the period reported in Paper IV. Third, 
the effects of social capital found in Paper IV could neither be confirmed 
nor rejected in Paper III since there are no data on trust on municipal level 
available for the years studied in that paper.  
Taken together the four papers have shown that valuations, in a broader 
sense than preferences, and beliefs that people hold are important for the 
design of environmental regulations. First, it is important to clarify what 
kind of values the policy aim to promote, how these values are related to 
each other and if and how they can be estimated. Second, opinions about 
values and, more specifically, about property rights are important to assess 
the legitimacy of different policy measures. Finally, different valuations 
affect the compliance with environmental regulations. Although it has been 
shown that the frequency of inspections is an important factor for increasing 
compliance, it seems as if this partly is an effect of the advise and 
information that the inspectors provide the business with. Moreover, it has 
been shown that the level of trust, a common indicator of social capital, 
have a significant impact on compliance behaviour. However, even if the 
effect is partly positive, it seems as if trust, perhaps in a naïve form, 
encourages violation rather than compliance.    29 
References  
Ariansen, Per. U1992). Miljöfilosofi. Nya Doxa, Nora. 1-236. 
Arora, S. & Gangopadhyay, S. (1995). Toward a theoretical model of voluntary 
overcompliance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 28 (3), 289-309. 
Becker, Gary S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political 
Economy 76 (2), 169-217. 
Beckerman, Wilfred & Pasek, Joanna. (1997). Plural Values and Environmental Valuation. 
Environmental Values 6, 65-86. 
Bouvier, R. (2009). Determinants of Environmental Performance Pulp and Paper Mills, 
Regulations, and Community in Maine. Economic Development Quarterly 23 (2), 111-26. 
Braga, Jacinto & Starmer, Chris. (2005). Preference Anomalies, Preference Elicitation and 
the Discovered Preference Hypothesis. Environmental and Resource Economics 32 (1), 55-89. 
Brown, Thomas C. (1984). The Concept of Value in Resource Allocation. Land Economics 
60 (3), 231-46. 
Burby, Raymond J. & Paterson, Robert G. (1993). Improving Compliance with State 
Environmental-Regulations. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12 (4), 753-72. 
Cohen, M. A. (1987). Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil-Spills - An Application 
of A Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard. Journal of Law & Economics 30 (1), 23-51. 
Cohen, Mark A. (1999). Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy. In: Folmer, 
Henk and Tietenberg, Tom (eds.) The international yearbook of environmental and resource 
economics: 1999/2000: A survey of current issues. Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 44-106. 
Curtis, John A. (2001). The Use of Follow-Up Questions to No Responses in Dichotomous 
Choice Contingent Valuation Surveys. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 30 (2), 
189-97. 
Eckert, H. (2004). Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage 
regulation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47 (2), 232-59. 
Eggertsson, Thràinn. 1990. Economic behavior and institutions. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 1-385. 
Foulon, M., Lanoie, P. & Laplante, B. (2002). Incentives for pollution control: Regulation 
or information? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44 (1), 169-87. 
Freeman, A. Myrick, III. 2003. The measurement of environmental and resource values: Theory and 
methods. 1-491. 
Gray, W. B. & Scholz, J. T. (1993). Does Regulatory Enforcement Work - A Panel Analysis 
of Osha Enforcement. Law & Society Review 27 (1), 177-213.   30
Gray, Wayne B. & Deily, Mary E. (1996). Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution 
regulation in the US steel industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31 
(1), 96-111. 
Gren, Ing-Marie, Folke, Carl, Turner, Kerry & Bateman, Ian. (1994). Primary and 
Secondary Values of Wetland Ecosystems. Environmental and Resource Economics 4, 55-74. 
Gunningham, N., Kagan, R. A. & Thornton, D. (2004). Social license and environmental 
protection: Why businesses go beyond compliance. Law and Social Inquiry-Journal of the 
American Bar Foundation 29 (2), 307-41. 
Hanemann, W. Michael. (1994). Valuing the Environment through Contingent Valuation. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (4), 19-43. 
Hanley, Nick & Shogren, Jason F. (2005). Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Anomaly-Proof? 
Environmental and Resource Economics 32 (1), 13-34. 
Harrison, K. (1995). Is Cooperation the Answer - Canadian Environmental Enforcement in 
Comparative Context. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14 (2), 221-44. 
Hatcher, A., Jaffry, S., Thebaud, O. & Bennett, E. (2000). Normative and social influences 
affecting compliance with fishery regulations. Land Economics 76 (3), 448-61. 
Jones, Michael. (1993). Landscape as a resource and the problem of landscape values. In: 
Rusten, C. and Wøien, H. (eds.) The Politics of Environmental Conservation. Proceedings from 
a Workshop in Trondheim March 26, 1993. Report no. 6/93. The University of Trondheim, 
Centre for Environment and Development (SMU), pp 19-33. 
Laplante, B. & Rilstone, P. (1996). Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and 
paper industry in Quebec. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31 (1), 19-
36. 
Lockwood, Michael. (1997). Integrated value theory for natural areas. Ecological Economics 20, 
83-93. 
Magat, W. A. & Viscusi, W. K. (1990). Effectiveness of the Epas Regulatory Enforcement - 
the Case of Industrial Effluent Standards. Journal of Law & Economics 33 (2), 331-60. 
Malinvaud, E. 1972. Lectures on Microeconomic Theory. North Holland, Amsterdam.  
Mcgraw, K. M. & Scholz, J. T. 1991. Appeals to Civic Virtue Versus Attention to Self-
Interest - Effects on Tax Compliance. Law & Society Review 25 (3), 471-98. 
Nadeau, L. W. (1997). EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level 
noncompliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 34 (1), 54-78. 
Ng, Yew-Kwang. (1979). Welfare Economics. Introduction and Devolopment of Basic Concepts. 
The MacMillan Press Ltd, London.  
Nostbakken, L. (2008). Fisheries law enforcement - A survey of the economic literature. 
Marine Policy 32 (3), 293-300. 
Nyborg, K. & Telle, K. (2006). Firms' compliance to environmental regulation: Is there 
really a paradox? Environmental & Resource Economics 35 (1), 1-18. 
O’Neill, J. (1992). The varieties of intrinsic value. The Monist 75, 119-33. 
Pearce, David W. and Turner, R. Kerry. 1990. Economics of natural resources and the 
environment. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire. -xiii, 378. 
Perman, Roger, Ma, Yue, and McGilvray, James. (1996). Natural Resource & Environmental 
Economics. Longman, London and New York. 1-388. 
Randall, Alan. (1987). Resource Economics. An Economic Approach to Natural Resource and 
Environmental Policy. John Wiley & Son, New York. 1-434. 
Sagoff, Mark. (1994). Should Preferences Count? Land Economics 70 (2), 127-44.   31 
SFS (1989:364). (1997). Miljöskyddsförordning.  
SFS (1998:808). (2009) Miljöbalken (The Swedish Environmental Code).   
Söderqvist, Tore. (1998). Why Give up Money for the Baltic Sea? Motives for People's 
Willingness (or Reluctance) to Pay. Environmental and Resource Economics 12, 249-54. 
Spash, Clive L. & Hanley, Nick. (1995). Preferences, information and biodiversity 
preservation. Ecological Economics 12, 191-208. 
Stafford, S. L. (2002). The effect of punishment on firm compliance with hazardous waste 
regulations. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44 (2), 290-308. 
Stafford, S. L. (2007). Can consumers enforce environmental regulations? The role of the 
market in hazardous waste compliance. Journal of Regulatory Economics 31 (1), 83-107. 
Stevens, Thomas H., Echeverria, Jaime, Glass, Ronald J., Hager, Tim & More, Thomas A. 
(1991). Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What Do CVM Estimates Really 
Show? Land Economics 67 (4), 390-400. 
Sugden, Robert. (2005). Anomalies and Stated Preference Techniques: A Framework for a 
Discussion of Coping Strategies. Environmental and Resource Economics 32 (1), 1-12. 
Tietenberg, Tom. (2006). Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. Pearson Education1-
655. 
Vadnjal, Dan & O'Connor, Martin. (1994). What is the Value of Rangitoto Island? 
Environmental Values 3, 369-80. 
Vatn, Arild. (2004). Environmental Valuation and Rationality. Land Economics 80 (1), 1-18. 
Winter, S. C. & May, P. J. (2001). Motivation for compliance with environmental 
regulations. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20 (4), 675-98. 
    33 
Acknowledgements 
Ing-Marie, thank you! Without your scientific, financial and mental support 
I would not have finished this. I am grateful for all teaching possibilities 
over the years, both since I find the teaching meaningful, inspiring and fun 
but also since it gave me possibilities to continue this work. But I am even 
more than grateful for the teaching possibilities I did not get… forcing me 
to not just continue but to also finish this work.  
Once upon the time I started my career at the department as an 
amanuensis for Svante Axelsson. Thank you, Svante, for introducing me 
both to the subject of Natural Resource and Environmental Economics and 
to teaching. Most of us at the division of “Strukturekonomi” had at that 
time our offices in the attic
3. It was cold in the winter and hot in the 
summer (those were the times when academics had to suffer…), but it was 
an inspiring group. Svante has already been mentioned. Then, in the south-
east corner we had Professor Frank Petrini who introduced the subject of 
Natural Resource and Environmental Economics at the department, thank 
you for that Frank. Thomas Hahn and Hillevi Helmfrid, amanuensis 
colleagues from that period, thank you for all inspiring discussions about 
economics and environmental questions. Those discussions have inspired 
me to try to think critically about economics, and to think critically about 
critical thinking about economics. Many others contributed to an 
environment that was both intellectual stimulating and inspiring in other 
ways (not the least through all floor-ball and frisbee golf games); thank you 
Mark Brady, Johan Malmberg, Peter Frykblom and Olle Byström and 
others for being part of that!  
Many others have been important as colleagues and friends. Erik 
Fahlbeck, thanks for important funding and for intellectual and mental 
support. Rob Hart, Ficre Zehaie, Ruben Hoffmann, Katarina Elofsson and 
Monica Campos; thank you for being both friends, helpful colleagues and 
                                                  
3 Over the years I have had offices on the second and the first floors in the building, and now 
finally on the ground floor. I guess I end up in the basement if this thesis does not pass….   34
stimulating discussants. Dan Vadnjal, thanks for introducing important issues 
about valuation, for introducing me to climbing and for lending your car for 
a most important trip to the rocks of Åland. Mattias Carlsson, thanks for all 
practical help with the questionnaires. Daniel Wikström, thank your for all 
help with the non-parametric econometrics (any remaining errors are my 
fault).  
The Friends of the Goblin. You have been true friends, supporting when 
needed and hampering when suitable. Thank you, the whole crew.  
Over the years Knut Per Hasund has been one of the most important and 
stimulating discussion partners. I more than enjoy discussing definitions, 
distinctions, interpretations etc. with you… I really hope that we can 
continue with that. And now we will finally find the time to write that 
paper,,, won’t we? In addition to being a good colleague and friend you are 
my favourite marriage intermediary! Thanks for employing both me and 
Helene!  
Thanks to the SOM Institute for making their data on attitudes among 
Swedes available, to Jonas Christensen for valuable comments on the 
questionnaire and to pre-reviewers for helpful comments on the papers.  
For the financial support of my work I am indebted to the faculty of 
Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences, for funding through the 
projects “the Pastoral Landscape” and “Krusenberg”, and to Formas for 
funding through the project “Efterlevnad av svenska miljöregleringar: 
sociala normer och ekonomiska vinster”. Many thanks to the Department of 
Economics, and to all Heads of the Department during my years here, for 
financial support and for giving me the opportunities to teach and to finish 
this thesis. Many thank to all of the staff at the department that makes the 
everyday work work.  
Steve Scott Robson proof-readade most of the texts and it are thank to 
he that not all meanings is as this (I didn’t not showade this meaning for he, 
I think it is in the closest perfect in all cases). Thank you so much, Steve.  
To the rest of you that contributed! Many apologies for not finding 
words or names to express my gratitude.  
Many thanks to my family and relatives for being valuable parts of the 
rest of the life that I have had too little time for. To my mother, father and 
mother in law: thanks for taking care of Ylva and Vidar making it possible 
for me to work without bad conscience.  
Helene, without our employments at the department we would probably 
not have found each other and there would be no Ylva and Vidar. So, in a 
sense the three of you are an outcome of my time at the department. 
Moreover, without any doubt, and independent of value perspective, you 
are the most valuable outcome. None of you have known me when not 
being a doctoral candidate… I promise that that version of me will spend   35 
more time with you and take more part in the everyday cares, musts and 
trivialities.  
Helene, I am more than grateful for all help with “my part” of the work 
at home during the periods when I spent to much time with this thesis. 
Even more important was your encouragement, support and your efforts to 
convince me that I have something to contribute with.  
Helene, Ylva and Vidar, thank you for just being part of my life! And 
thanks for your patience. Now, this writing is finished. So now..! Well…, I 
first have some vacuum cleaning etc. to catch up on… But then! Let’s go 
skiing, kayaking, climbing, playing football, scouting, baking, cooking, 
needle felting, wood-carving, LEGOing, playing and just living instead.  
 
 
 
Fredrik Holstein 
Uppsala, December 2009 
 
 